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Abstract
We define a nonmonotonic formalism that shares some features with three other systems of non-
monotonic reasoning—default logic, logic programming with strong negation, and nonmonotonic
causal logic—and study its possibilities as a language for describing actions.
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1 Introduction
A stable model of a logic program, according to the original definition of the stable model
semantics [4], is a set of ground atoms. Intuitively, the atoms that belong to the model are
true, and all other atoms are false. Thus a stable model gives complete information about
the truth values of all atoms; the incompleteness of information encoded in a logic program
can be only expressed by the existence of several stable models.
When classical (strong) negation was added to the language of logic programs in [5],
and the term “answer set” was introduced, the situation changed. An answer set is a set
of ground literals that is consistent but possibly incomplete. Thus an answer set can be
thought of as a function that assigns to each ground atom A one of three values: true (A
belongs to the set), false (¬A belongs to the set), or unknown (the set contains neither A
nor ¬A). An answer set can represent incomplete information.
On the other hand, in the original stable model semantics truth and falsity were not
symmetric: if an atom does not occur in the heads of rules of a logic program then it is
treated as false. In the answer set semantics, the truth value of such an atom is unknown.
To sum up, 1988-style stable models are asymmetric and represent complete information;
1991-style answer sets are symmetric and can represent incomplete information.
The nonmonotonic formalism described in this note is motivated by the fact that some
important uses of answer set programming (ASP) call for both symmetry and completeness.
We often encounter this situation when ASP is applied to reasoning about truth-valued
fluents. To describe a state, we need to provide complete information about the values of all
fluents. The modification of the stable model semantics defined below treats truth and falsity
symmetrically, like the 1991 version, and at the same time guarantees the completeness of
information, as the 1988 version.
Two-valued logic programs share some features with default logic [13] and with nonmono-
tonic causal logic in the sense of [11]. As in the case of default logic, the nonmonotonicity
of two-valued logic programs is determined by the use of “justifications.” Literals play a
special role in their syntax, as they do in the definition of an answer set in [5], and this fact
allows us to make their semantics relatively simple: it does not refer to deductive closure in
the sense of classical logic. As in nonmonotonic causal logic, their semantics is defined in
terms of two-valued truth assignments—or, in other words, consistent and complete sets of
literals—rather than (possibly incomplete) extensions or (possibly incomplete) answer sets.
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2 Definitions
2.1 Syntax
In this note, formulas are propositional formulas formed from a fixed set σ of atoms. A
(two-valued) rule is an expression of the form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln : F, (1)
where the head L0 and the premises L1, . . . , Ln (n ≥ 0) are literals, and the justification F
is a formula. Rule (1) reads: derive L0 from L1, . . . , Ln if F is a consistent assumption.
A pair of rules of the form
A ← L1, . . . , Ln : F ∧A,
¬A ← L1, . . . , Ln : F ∧ ¬A,
where A is an atom, can be abbreviated as
{A} ← L1, . . . , Ln : F (2)
(“derive any of the literals A, ¬A from L1, . . . , Ln if that literal is consistent with assump-
tion F”). This abbreviation is similar to choice rules in the sense of [12]. Both in (1) and
in (2), if F is > (truth) then we will drop the colon and F at the end of the rule. If, in
addition, n = 0 then ← can be dropped too.
A (two-valued) program is a set of rules.
2.2 Semantics
As in classical propositional logic, an interpretation is a function from σ to {false, true}.
We will identify an interpretation I with the set of literals that are satisfied by I.
The reduct of a program Π relative to an interpretation I is the set of rules
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln (3)
corresponding to the rules (1) of Π for which I |= F . We say that I is a model of Π if the
smallest set of literals closed under the rules (3) equals I. In other words, models of Π are
fixpoints of the operator αΠ from interpretations to sets of literals defined as follows: αΠ(I)
is the smallest set of literals closed under the reduct of Π relative to I.
It is clear that the set of models of a program is not affected by replacing the justification
of a rule with an equivalent formula. It is clear also that every literal that belongs to a model
of Π is the head of a rule of Π. It follows that if some atom from σ does not occur in the
heads of rules then the program is inconsistent (that is, has no models). This is a property
that two-valued programs share with causal theories in the sense of [11].
2.3 Example
Let Π be the program
{a},
b← a, (4)
or, written in full,
a ← : a,
¬a ← : ¬a,
b ← a : >,
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with σ = {a, b}. Since Π has no rules with the head ¬b, the only possible models are
I1 = {a, b} and I2 = {¬a, b}. The reduct of Π relative to I1 consists of the rules a and
b← a, so that αΠ(I1) = {a, b} = I1; I1 is a model. The reduct relative to I2 consists of the
rules ¬a and b← a, so that αΠ(I2) = {¬a} 6= I2; I2 is not a model.
2.4 Constraints
Adding a pair of rules of the form
A ← : F,
¬A ← : F (5)
to a program Π eliminates the models of Π that satisfy F . (Proof: adding these rules makes
the reduct of the program relative to I inconsistent if I satisfies F , and does not affect the
reduct otherwise.) We will call (5) a constraint and write it as ← F .
2.5 Clausal Form
We say that a program Π is in clausal form if each of its justifications is a conjunction of
literals (possibly the empty conjunction >). For instance, program (4) is in clausal form.
Replacing a rule of the form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln : F ∨G
in any program with the pair of rules
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln : F,
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln : G
does not affect the set of models. (Proof: for any interpretation I, the reduct relative to I
remains the same.) It follows that any program can be converted to clausal form by rewriting
the justifications in disjunctive normal form and then breaking every rule into several rules
corresponding to the disjunctive terms of its justification.
3 Relation to Traditional ASP Programs
3.1 Reduction to Programs with Strong Negation
As mentioned in the introduction, two-valued programs are essentially a special case of
nondisjunctive programs with strong negation. To make that claim precise, we will define
a simple translation that turns any two-valued program Π in clausal form into a program
with strong negation. That program, tv2sn(Π), is the set of rules
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln,not Ln+1, . . . ,not Lp
for all rules
L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln : Ln+1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lp
of Π. (By L we denote the literal complementary to L.) For instance, tv2sn turns program (4)
into
a ← not ¬a,
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An interpretation I (that is to say, a sound and complete set of literals) is a model of Π
iff I is an answer set of tv2sn(Π). (Proof: the reduct of tv2sn(Π) relative to I in the sense
of [5] is identical to the reduct of Π relative to I.) In other words, models of Π are identical
to complete answer sets of tv2sn(Π). For instance, program (6) has two answer sets, {a, b}
and {¬a}. The first of them is the only model of (4); the second is incomplete.
Incomplete answer sets of a program with strong negation can be eliminated by adding
the rules
← not A,not ¬A (7)
for all atoms A. Consequently models of a program Π in clausal form are identical to the
answer sets of the program obtained from tv2sn(Π) by adding rules (7) for all A from σ.
3.2 Complete Answer Sets in Disguise
In many ASP programs, strong negation is not used at all. Answer sets of such a program are
sets of positive literals; the intuition is that the falsity of an atom is indicated by its absence
in the answer set, rather than the presence of its negation. In this situation, we can think
of an answer set consisting of positive literals as a “complete answer set in disguise”—as a
complete answer set X with all negative literals removed (symbolically, X ∩ σ).
Similarly, a program without strong negation can be viewed as a “two-valued program
in disguise.” Let Π be a set of rules of the form
A0 ← A1, . . . , An,not An+1, . . . ,not Ap, (8)
where each Ai is an atom. By lp2tv(Π) we denote the two-valued program consisting of the
rules
A0 ← A1, . . . , An : ¬An+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ap
for all rules (8) of Π, and the rules
¬A← : ¬A (9)
for all atoms A. Rule (9) makes the closed world assumption for A explicit.
Answer sets of Π can be characterized as sets of the form X ∩ σ, where X is a model
of lp2tv(Π). (Proof: tv2sn(lp2tv(Π)) is the closed world interpretation of Π in the sense of
[5, Section 6].) Thus the map X 7→ X ∩ σ is a 1–1 correspondence between the models of
lp2tv(Π) and the models of Π.
Consider, for instance, the program Π consisting of one rule a← not b. The correspond-
ing two-valued program is
a ← : ¬b,
¬a ← : ¬a,
¬b ← : ¬b.
Its only model is {a,¬b}. By removing the negative literal ¬b from it, we get {a}, the only
answer set of Π.
4 Relation to Causal Logic
Recall that a causal theory in the sense of [11] is a set of rules of the form F ← G, where
F and G are propositional formulas. The reduct of a causal theory T relative to an inter-
pretation I is the set of the heads F of all rules F ← G of T for which I satisfies G. An
V. Lifschitz 263
interpretation I is a model of a causal theory T if the reduct of T relative to I is satisfied by I
and is not satisfied by any other interpretation. This semantics formalizes the philosophical
principle that McCain and Turner call the law of universal causation.
A causal theory is definite if the head of each of its rules is a literal. For any definite
causal theory T , we define the corresponding two-valued program ct2tv(T ) as the set of rules
F ← : G for all rules F ← G of T . Models of any definite causal theory T are identical to
models of program ct2tv(T ). (Proof: consider the reduct X of a definite causal theory T
relative to an interpetation I; I is the only interpretation satisfying X iff X = I.) In
other words, definite causal theories are essentially two-valued programs whose rules have
no premises. We can say also that two-valued programs generalize definite causal theories
by allowing “logic programming style premises” in the bodies of rules.
If the bodies of rules of a definite causal theory T are conjunctions of literals then ct2tv(T )
is a program in clausal form, and the transformation tv2sn defined above can be used to
turn that program into a program with strong negation. By composing ct2tv with tv2sn we
get the translation from the language of causal theories into logic programming with strong
negation familiar from [10, Section 6.3.3].
5 Representing Action Descriptions by Two-Valued Programs
Consider a finite set σ of propositional atoms divided into two groups, fluents and elementary
actions. An action is a function from elementary actions to truth values. A transition
system T is determined by a set of functions from fluents to truth values, called the states
of T , and a set of triples 〈s0, a, s1〉, where s0 and s1 are states of T , and a is an action.
These triples are called the transitions of T . A transition system can be visualized as a
directed graph that has states as its vertices, with an edge from s0 to s1 labeled a for every
transition 〈s0, a, s1〉. Informally speaking, a transition 〈s0, a, s1〉 expresses the possibility of
the system changing its state from s0 to s1 when the elementary actions to which a assigns
the value true are concurrently executed.
Action description languages B and C, defined in [6, Section 5, 6] and [8], and reviewed
in [7, Section 2], serve for describing action domains by specifying transition systems. They
are closely related to logic programs under the answer set semantics [1, 9]. In this section we
show how the semantics of B and of a large (“definite”) fragment of C can be characterized
in terms of two-valued programs.
5.1 Translating B-Descriptions
This review of the syntax of B follows [7, Section 2.1.1]. A fluent literal is a literal containing
a fluent. A condition is a set of fluent literals. An action description in the language B, or
a B-description, is a set of expressions of two forms: static laws
L if C,
where L is a fluent literal, and C is a condition, and dynamic laws
e causes L if C,
where e is an elementary action, L is a fluent literal, and C is a condition. The semantics of
the language (see, for instance, [7, Section 2.1.2]) defines, for every B-description D, which
transition system it represents.
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The set of transitions of that system can be described by the program b2tv(D), defined
as follows. Its signature σ1 consists of the symbols of the forms
f(0), e(0), f(1), (10)
where f is a fluent and e is an elementary action. Its rules are
(i) L(t)← L1(t), . . . , Ln(t), where t = 0, 1, for each static law
L if L1, . . . , Ln
from D;
(ii) L(1)← e(0), L1(0), . . . , Ln(0) for each dynamic law
e causes L if L1, . . . , Ln
from D;
(iii) L(1)← L(0) : L(1) for every fluent literal L,
(iv) {A(0)} for every atom A of σ.
Rules (iii) solve the frame problem by formalizing the commonsense law of inertia [14]; they
are similar to the “frame default” from [13]. Rules (iv) express that both the initial values
of fluents and the elementary actions to be executed can be chosen arbitrarily.
Recall that we agreed to identify truth-valued functions with sets of literals (Section 2.2).
Using this convention, we can characterize the set of transitions of an arbitrary B-descrip-
tion D in terms of models of b2tv(D) as follows:
Proposition. For any sets s0, s1 of fluent literals, and any action a, 〈s0, a, s1〉 is a transi-
tion of T (D) iff the set
{L(0) : L ∈ s0 ∪ a} ∪ {L(1) : L ∈ s1}
is a model of b2tv(D).
This fact is a reformulation of Lemma 2 from [7], in view of the property of the trans-
formation tv2sn noted in Section 3.1. It establishes a 1–1 correspondence between the
transitions of D and the models of b2tv(D).
5.2 Translating Definite C-Descriptions
This review of the syntax of C follows [7, Section 2.2.1]. An action description in the language
C, or C-description, is a set of expressions of the two forms: static laws
caused F if G, (11)
where F and G are formulas that do not contain elementary actions, and dynamic laws
caused F if G after H, (12)
where F and G are formulas that do not contain elementary actions, and H is a formula.
The semantics of the language (see, for instance, [7, Section 2.2.2]) defines, for every C-
description D, which transition system it represents.
A C-description is definite if, in each of its laws (11), (12), the head F is a literal.
For any definite C-description D, the set of transitions of the corresponding system can be
described by the program c2tv(D), defined as follows. Its signature σ1 consists of the same
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symbols (10) as in the case of B-descriptions. For any formula F of the signature σ, by F (0)
we will denote the formula of the signature σ1 obtained from F by appending the string ′(0)′
to each atom. For any formula F of the signature σ that does not contain elementary actions,
by F (1) we will denote the formula of the signature σ1 obtained from F by appending the
string ′(1)′ to each atom. The rules of c2tv(D) are
(i) F (t)← : G(t), where t = 0, 1, for each static law (11) from D;
(ii) F (1)← : G(1) ∧H(0) for each dynamic law (12) from D;
(iii) {A(0)} for every atom A of σ.
The characterization of transitions given by the proposition from Section 5.1, with b2tv
replaced by c2tv, holds for any definite C-description D. This fact is a corollary to Proposi-
tion 2 from [8], in view of the property of the transformation ct2tv noted in Section 4 above.
It establishes a 1–1 correspondence between the transitions of D and the models of c2tv(D).
If H in a dynamic law (12) is a conjunction of literals L1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ln then the rule in
clause (ii) of the definition of c2tv can be rewritten as
F (1)← L1(0), . . . , Ln(0) : G(1),
and the models of the theory will remain the same.
6 Conclusion
We have seen that the language of two-valued programs is sufficiently rich for expressing the
ASP solution to the frame problem that exploits the distinction between strong negation and
negation as failure (Section 5.1), and that it can model the uses of ASP that avoid strong
negation altogether (Section 3.2). There are also “mixed” representations, which express
the falsity of some atoms explicitly, in terms of strong negation, and treat the falsity of
other atoms in the spirit of an implicit closed world assumption. Such representations can
be often expressed by two-valued programs as well.
Uses of ASP for which the language of two-valued programs is inadequate are relatively
rare, but they do exist. Incomplete answer sets are essential for representing “weak ex-
ceptions” to defaults, as in [2, Example 3.2]: birds normally fly; wounded birds may or
may not fly. Another example is given by the approach to conformant planning presented
in [15]. The planner described in that paper operates with “partial states”—incomplete
sets of literals that approximate states in the sense of Section 5. The difference between
the applications of ASP that can be naturally represented by two-valued programs and the
applications for which it is not the case is an important distinction between two kinds of
answer set programs.
Two-valued programs can be viewed as a special case of multi-valued propositional for-
mulas under the stable model semantics introduced in [3].1 A preprocessor converting such
formulas (perhaps from a subset that includes two-valued programs) into input accepted by
answer set solvers would be a useful knowledge representation tool.
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